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The issue of attitude-behavior relations is revisited in light of recent work on motivation and the
psychology of goals. It is suggested that for object-attitudes to drive a specific behavior, a chain of
contingencies must be realized: Liking must be transmuted into wanting, wanting must evolve into a goal,
the goal must be momentarily dominant, and the specific behavior must be chosen as means of goal
pursuit. Our model thus specifies a set of mediating processes that transpire between attitudes and
behavior. Prior theories of attitude-behavior relations are examined from the present perspective, and its
conceptual and empirical implications are noted.
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If they do not know . . . what you want, they cannot know what you
plan to do next.
—Lord Baelish in Game of Thrones (Cogman & MacLaren, 2014)
Gordon Allport’s (1935) oft-cited statement that “the concept of
attitude . . . is the most distinctive and indispensable concept in
contemporary American social psychology” (p. 798) has reverber-
ated in the proliferation of attitude research over the years. Indeed,
the scientific study of attitudes has been the most popular and
voluminous topic of research in all of social psychology (for
reviews see, e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975; Albarracin, Johnson, &
Zanna, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Krosnick & Petty, 1995;
McGuire, 1968; Petty & Wegener, 1998, among others). A search
for the term “attitude” on PSYCInfo yields a staggering 390,308
results, as compared with the results for terms such as “cognition”
(132,490 results), “motivation” (124,454 results), and “decision”
(155,889 results).
Arguably, the immense popularity of the attitude construct owes
in part to the fact that attitudes were assumed to predict behavior.
Allport (1929) viewed “an attitude (as) a disposition to act” (p.
221, parentheses added). Other authors, too, emphasized the pre-
sumptive link between attitudes and behavior. Thus, Cohen (1960)
stated that “attitudes are always seen as precursors of behavior, as
determinants of how a person will actually behave in his daily
affairs” (pp. 137–138). Similarly, Petty and Wegener (1998) af-
firmed that “attitudes (are) important because of the fundamental
role that individuals’ attitudes . . . play in the critical choices
people make regarding their own health and security as well as
those of their families, friends and nations” (p. 3230). If psychol-
ogy’s overarching “goal is the prediction and control of behavior”
(Watson, 1913, p. 158), it follows that the attitude-behavior link is
of crucial importance hence understanding it poses a significant
challenge for psychological science.
Accordingly, substantial work in social psychology was devoted
to questions about the kinds of attitudes that promote behavior and
the conditions that facilitate the attitude behavior link (e.g., Ajzen,
1985, 2012, 2014; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fabrigar, Petty, Smith,
& Crites, 2006; Fazio, 1990, 1995; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975;
Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Regan & Fazio, 1977; Sivacek & Crano,
1982, among others).
The search for moderators of the attitude behavior relation was
likely sparked by early accumulation of findings that not all
attitudes actually prompt behavior. Well known in this regard is
Wicker’s (1969) review, which found “little evidence to support
the postulated existence of stable, underlying attitudes within the
individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his
actions” (p. 75). Wicker concluded, somewhat pessimistically, that
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“it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or
only slightly related to overt behaviors than that attitudes will be
closely related to actions” (p. 65) and he challenged researchers to
look for “factors . . . which are consistently better predictors of
overt behavior than attitudes” (Wicker, 1969, p. 75, italics added).
The gauntlet thrown down by Wicker (1969) was heartily
picked up by social psychologists; however, rather than relinquish-
ing the concept of attitudes as predictors of behavior and seeking
“better predictors” elsewhere, investigators proceeded to elaborate
influential conceptual frameworks and to generate empirical find-
ings concerning moderating conditions required for the attitude-
behavior relationship to be manifest.
Roughly, much of the work on the attitude-behavior relation was
carried out under two major research programs centered on the
notions of (a) attitude strength, and (b) behavior focus, respec-
tively. The attitude strength program (see Krosnick & Petty, 1995,
for a comprehensive review) adopts the premise that only suffi-
ciently strong attitudes drive behavior, where attitude strength is
attested by indices such as accessibility, extremity, confidence, and
elaborative basis, among others. The behavior focus program
(Ajzen, 1985, 2012, 2014; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975) maintains that general object attitudes are unlikely to
be related to behavior (a notion they discuss under their compat-
ibility principle, Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp. 258–259), and that
behavioral prediction is better accomplished from attitudes toward
the behavior itself.
Both research programs are reviewed and extensively discussed
in subsequent sections of this article. First, however, we present a
novel perspective on the attitude behavior relation anchored in the
psychology of goals. Broadly, we propose that attitudes toward
objects, even if strong, or toward behavior, even if highly positive,
are insufficient in and of themselves to incite action.1 Instead,
human behavior is driven by goals. The latter notion seems to be
common knowledge in fact. People pervasively respond to the
question of why they performed a past behavior, or why they
intend to perform a future behavior by pointing to a state of affairs
(a goal) that their behavior was or is meant to achieve (cf. Goll-
witzer, 1999). Why does one run every evening? To be fit (defin-
ing fitness as the goal). Why does one study till the wee hours of
the morning? To pass an exam.
To say that behavior is goal driven is not meant to suggest that
attitudes are irrelevant to behavior. To be sure, attitudes are
involved in the enactment of behavior by contributing to goal
formation. However, object attitudes alone do not produce goals.
For behavior to occur, a conjunction of several things of uncertain
likelihood must take place, a perfect storm of sorts.
In a gist, attitudes toward objects contribute to the evaluative
part of goals: An attitude (liking)2 for an object that one does not
presently possess must translate into a desire for it or a “want” of
sufficient magnitude (Berridge, 2004; Kruglanski, Chernikova,
Rosenzweig, & Köpetz, 2014) and then be conjoined to a per-
ceived attainability (i.e., reasonable expectancy) of obtaining the
object of one’s desire; beyond a certain threshold the desirability-
attainability compound transforms into a goal whose attainment
may be enabled by a behavioral means. Even this might not suffice
for behavior to take place, however. For a goal might be overrid-
den by other, more pressing objectives activated in the situation.3
A goal must dominate those alternative concerns for behavior in its
service to take place. In a sense then, the goal construct is the
proverbial “elephant in the room,” the missing link whose explicit
recognition promises to cast a new light upon the attitude-behavior
enigma.
Our analysis is much indebted to prior theories and empirical
findings on the attitude-behavior consistency, and it integrates
them with recent work on the psychology of goals (e.g., Bargh &
Ferguson, 2000; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Kruglanski, 1996;
Kruglanski et al., 2002, 2012, 2014; Morsella, Bargh, & Gollwit-
zer, 2009). In essence, we flesh out from a goal theoretic perspec-
tive what may have been only implicit in our predecessors’ ideas.
However, the proposed explication is not a mere rehash of existing
concepts; instead, it identifies exceptions to prior formulations and
reveals phenomena that have been heretofore obscured.
To foreshadow what is to come, we begin by presenting our
conceptual perspective on the attitude behavior relation. We then
review major prior analyses of this relation and reinterpret them in
goal theoretic terms. A closing discussion draws the implications
of our analysis for conceptual and empirical matters concerning
the concept of attitudes and its ultimate relevance to behavior.
A Goal Systemic Analysis of the
Attitude-Behavior Relation
Defining the “Attitude Concept”
Although various definitions of the term attitude have been
offered,4 the one that has stuck and has managed to command wide
consensus views attitude as a positive or negative evaluation of
some object (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975; Bem, 1970; Cacioppo,
Harkins, & Petty, 1981; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 2007;
Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997; Thurstone, 1931). In what
follows, therefore, we too adopt this widely accepted view of
attitudes as evaluations.
We also are assuming that an attitude thus defined is essentially
a cognitive construct with several distinctive properties often dis-
cussed under the common rubric of attitude strength (Krosnick &
Petty, 1995): An attitude is a judgment that a given object or state
of affairs falls somewhere on the continuum between good and
bad, or likable versus unlikable. It is possible also to conceptualize
attitudes as located on two separate continua one of goodness the
other of badness (Armitage & Conner, 2000). The specific location
on the continuum (or continua) defines the property of attitude
extremity (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). As a cognitive construct, too,
1 Other writers made this same point. Specifically, Calder and Ross
(1973, p. 7), expressed doubt that “the mere fact that one has an attitude
would produce behavior in and of itself.” Echoing these writers’ sentiment,
Fazio (1995, p. 271) expressed reluctance “to ascribe any energizing value
to attitudes.”
2 By “liking” we mean a positive evaluation rather than merely an
affective response.
3 For instance, an individual may abandon the goal of showing up at an
important meeting, if the goal of caring for his or her sick child was
activated. Again, it is not only the positive attitude toward the child’s
health but attainability of improving the child’s health through one’s
staying at home that drives the behavior. If the child was at a far away land,
so that one could do little for its benefit, one might have attended the
meeting as planned originally.
4 Such as Allport’s (1929) notion that “an attitude is a disposition to act,”
(p. 221) or the tripartite definition of attitude as containing cognitive,
affective and behavioral components (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960).
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2 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
one’s degree of confidence in an attitude (or evaluation) may vary
depending on the kind of evidence one has for the attitudinal belief
in question. For instance if one’s own epistemic authority in a
given domain (Kruglanski et al., 2005) was high, one could infer
one’s attitude from one’s own experiences or gut feelings toward
the entity in question (Fazio & Zanna, 1978). If evaluations of an
object on separate goodness and badness dimensions were dispa-
rate (e.g., the object was judged as highly positive but also as
highly negative) one could speak of attitude ambivalence (Armit-
age & Conner, 2000). Too, as cognitive constructs attitudes may
vary in their accessibility, that is, in the readiness to which object
evaluations (or liking for the object) come to mind upon exposure
to the object (Fazio, 1990; Higgins, 1996).
Properties of the “Goal” Concept
We view the goal concept as a cognitive construct, a mental
representation whose contents are of motivational significance
(Kruglanski, 1996, p. 599). These contents define a goal as “a
desirable5 future state of affairs one intends to attain through
action” (Kruglanski, 1996, p. 600). This dynamic definition per-
tains to goals of all types and levels of importance or of generality.
It describes such grand life objectives as getting an advanced
degree or becoming a concert violinist, and also such minute goals
as crossing a busy street, picking an hors d’oeuvre from a tray, or
avoiding a conversation with a stranger. In all these cases, a
desirable state perceived as attainable (a coveted academic or
artistic attainment, a safe arrival at a desired location, consumption
of a tasty snack, preserving one’s privacy) fosters action aimed at
its attainment. Beyond its dynamic contents, goal’s cognitive prop-
erties as a mental representation render it subject to the same
processes and principles that govern all cognitive constructs, in-
cluding the processes of inference, knowledge activation, and
unconscious impact as discussed subsequently.
Desirability and attainability. As already noted, for some-
thing to be adopted as a goal it must be recognized as desirable as
well as attainable given one’s resources. In other words, to adopt
a given goal one needs to infer from appropriate evidence that the
state of affairs in question is sufficiently desirable and attainable.
The desirability (related to value) and attainability (related to
expectancy) components of goals are immanent in major theoret-
ical analyses of motivation. Atkinson (1964) for instance noted
that “the strength of the tendency to act in a certain way depends
upon the strength of expectancy that the act will be followed by a
given consequence (or goal) and the value of that consequence (or
goal) to the individual” (p. 274). More recently, Shah and Higgins
(1997) stated that “an increase in either attainment expectancy
(i.e., attainability) or attainment value (i.e., desirability) produces
an increase in goal commitment” (p. 447). Similarly, Forster,
Liberman, and Friedman (2007) argued that goal priming effects
(reflecting goal magnitude) are proportional to the product of the
goal’s expectancy and its value (desirability) and described em-
pirical evidence supportive of this notion.
Empirical Study 1: Lay perceptions of the goal concept.
Notions of desirability and attainability are presupposed also by
lay conceptions of the goal concept. We asked 104 American adult
participants on Mechanical Turk to evaluate a scenario generated
by a computer program designed to write stories. The scenario
described the following situation:
Taylor is a freshman in college. He recently learned about a 1-year
scholarship at his college. The winner of the scholarship receives
$0/$10,000. Each applicant has a 0%/25% chance of winning the
scholarship.
In a between-participants design, each of our subjects viewed
one of the four versions of this vignette, and responded to the
questions: (a) Would it make sense for Taylor to set a goal to get
this scholarship? (yes/no); and (b) Would it be rational for Taylor
to set a goal to get this scholarship? (yes/no).
Results of this study are clear (see Figure 1). Almost all partic-
ipants responded that it would not be rational, and would not make
sense, for the protagonist to set a goal in the zero desirability/zero
attainability, zero desirability/high attainability, and high desir-
ability/zero attainability conditions. In contrast, almost all partic-
ipants in the high desirability/high attainability condition an-
swered that it would be rational, and would make sense, for the
protagonist to set a goal in these circumstances. A 2 test com-
paring whether the four conditions were different from results that
could be expected by chance was highly significant (p  .001).
These findings, presented in Figure 1, attest that lay participants
view some degree of desirability and some (above zero) degree
attainability as essential to goal setting.
Accessibility. As cognitive structures, goals vary in their (mo-
mentary or chronic) accessibility (Higgins, 1996) and can be
activated or primed by relevant environmental stimuli such as its
semantic associates (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Fishbach & Fergu-
son, 2007; Morsella et al., 2009) or their means of attainment
(Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). It has been generally assumed, that for
it to drive behavior, a previously formed goal needs to be activated
(i.e., to be either chronically or momentarily accessible). We
assume, for example, that activating individuals’ liking toward
objects via the measurement of attitude accessibility (as described
in Fazio, 1990) may lead to quick goal formation, for instance
where the objects’ perceived attainability was high and no com-
peting and more dominant goals were active in the situation.
Unconscious impact. Decades of recent research have yielded
consistent evidence that activated goals can drive behavior below
the level of actors’ conscious awareness. Indeed, studies show that
unconsciously activated goals can lead to the same cognitive and
behavioral outcomes as conscious goals (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).
For example, Bargh et al. (2001), found in a classic study that
subliminally priming people with a goal to cooperate led them to
cooperate more in a resource-management game; moreover, this
effect was not mediated by consciously reported intentions (for
similar findings, see Hassin, Bargh, & Zimerman, 2009; Kleiman
& Hassin, 2011; Milyavsky, Hassin, & Schul, 2012).
Evidence that goal priming studies actually activate goals rather
than semantic concepts or attitudes derives from research (Bargh et
al., 2001) indicating that priming of a goal (e.g., achievement)
unlike semantic priming (e.g., priming of a trait “achiever”) inten-
sifies rather than decays with time, which is the case for mere
concepts or attitudes (Kunda, Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002).
In addition, Bargh et al. (2001) showed that people who were
subliminally primed (vs. not primed) with an automatic goal to
achieve exhibited greater task persistence in the face of obstacles,
5 Beyond a given threshold of desirability (Kruglanski et al., 2014).
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3ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
and higher resumption after distraction, features uniquely charac-
teristic of goal-driven activities (e.g., Lewin, 1935; Tolman, 1932).
In summary, we are assuming that behavior in general is goal
driven, and that this pertains both to deliberative behaviors whose
identification and choice may require considerable energy, and to
spontaneous behaviors that follow automatically from goal activa-
tion. For instance, one might sit closer to or further from another
person because one wanted (and had the goal, however implicit) to
initiate contact with that individual, or avoid contact as the case
may be. Such a goal would be constructed on the basis of relative
attitude (e.g., for contact vs. no contact) with that person, but only
where alternative links in the attitude-to-behavior chain were also
present. Thus, attitude toward contact would not determine behav-
ioral distancing where distancing was not seen as an attainable
option (as in a tightly packed metro train), nor where an alternative
dominant goal (e.g., cooperation with that person) was activated.
In what follows, we discuss in greater detail the several links that
mediate the attitude to behavior relation.
The “Rocky Road” Model of
Attitude-Behavior Relations
On Liking and Wanting
Liking is not wanting. As noted earlier, attitude refers to
positive evaluation or “liking” of an object or a state. Liking for an
object is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for wanting
it. It is not sufficient because, for instance, one may like what one
possesses already in which case liking for that object may not
produce wanting. Moreover, liking for something in the absolute is
not a necessary condition for wanting it, because one may prefer
an undesirable state (that one generally dislikes) over an even less
undesirable state (the lesser evil as it were). For instance, a person
may strive to leave one’s homeland and immigrate to a foreign
country even though one may not like in particular being there, yet
staying behind might be dangerous for oneself and one’s family.
As elaborated subsequently, it is relative liking for the one state
versus another that induces wanting, which then may translate into
goal formation.
A similar argument was made by Bagozzi (1992) in an early
article. As he aptly noted,
In and of themselves, evaluative appraisals such as those found in
attitudes do not imply motivational commitments. In contrast, the
existence of a desire, in the presence of a belief that one can act, is a
sufficient motivator to activate an intention and does not require a
positive evaluation. A person can want or desire to do something even
though it is unappealing, unpleasant, or in some other way evaluated
negatively (e.g., Fred wants to go to his father’s funeral although he
is distressed at the prospect of doing so). Likewise, one can want or
desire not to do something even though it is evaluated positively (e.g.,
Gail desires not to exercise today although she regards favorably the
consequences of doing so). Of course, desires often coincide with
evaluations, but it is important to recognize that these reactions are
unique responses with potentially different antecedents and conse-
quences. (p. 184)
Finally, Berridge (2004) recently proposed in the same vein that
“Liking” by itself is simply a triggered affective state—there is no
object of desire or incentive target, and no motivation for reward. It is
the process of incentive salience attribution [wanting] that makes a
specific associated stimulus or action the object of desire, and that tags
a specific behavior as the rewarded response. (p. 195)
Furthermore: “‘Liking’ without ‘wanting’ can be produced, and
so can ‘wanting’ without ‘liking’” (Berridge, 2004, p. 194). For
instance, manipulation of the mesolimbic dopamine systems was
shown to change wanting for a reward without changing liking for
it. Unlike liking, wanting is particularly influenced by dopamine
neurotransmission; dopamine manipulations in the nucleus accum-
bens have been shown to change wanting the reward without
having an effect on liking for it (Berridge & Robinson, 2003).
Accordingly:
“‘Liking’ without ‘wanting’ happens after brain manipulations that
cause mesolimbic dopamine neurotransmission to be suppressed. For
example, disruption of mesolimbic dopamine systems . . . dramati-
cally reduces ‘wanting’ to eat a tasty reward, but does not reduce
affective facial expressions of ‘liking’ for the same reward” (Berridge,
2004, p. 194).
Wanting as relative liking. To be sure, liking is not irrelevant
to wanting. In fact, research by Aarts, Custers, and colleagues
(Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Custers & Aarts, 2005, 2007)
demonstrated that associating positive or negative affect with
states such as “socializing” contributed to them becoming goals
(i.e., conditions that one wants to attain or avoid) that drive
behavior. However, how does liking translate into wanting? We
discuss this issue next.
Specifically, “wanting” refers to greater (approach) or lesser
(avoidance) liking for a possible future state relative to the current
state. That is, wanting appears when the anticipated assessment
(like or dislike) for the future state is either more or less positive
than that of the current state. Simply put, wanting arises from a
discrepancy between liking for the present versus the future state.
The motivating properties of discrepancy are highlighted in major
psychological theories of motivation (cf., Carver & Scheier, 1982,
1998; Custers & Aarts, 2005, 2007; Higgins, 1987; Miller, Gal-
anter, & Pribram, 1960; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001; Wie-
ner, 1948).
Figure 1. Perception of goals as a function of expectancy and desirabil-
ity.
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4 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
The discrepancy concept is also immanent in the lay understand-
ing of desire, and is pervasively represented in everyday parlance.
Questions like “Would you like some coffee,” “Would you like to
play tennis,” are tantamount to asking “Do you want coffee?” Do
you want [to play] tennis?” They inquire into one’s desire for those
future states (having coffee, playing tennis) and imply a possible
discrepancy between liking for them versus liking of their ab-
sence.6
We finally assume that a discrepancy in liking between a present
and a future state needs to reach above a certain threshold of
magnitude to translate into wanting. Minute discrepancies in lik-
ing, say, slightly lesser liking for sleeping in versus exercising at
the gym may not necessarily result in positively wanting to do the
latter.
Empirical Study 2: Bridging a discrepancy removes a desire.
If discrepancy (beyond a certain magnitude) induces a desire,
eliminating the discrepancy should remove the desire. Generically,
the latter case represents satiation (e.g., Karsten, 1928) a state in
which the gap is bridged between what one desired and what one
had already; thus, eliminating wanting while keeping liking intact.
To demonstrate this phenomenon empirically, we administered
surveys to two groups of participants (N 53), university students
at a major state university: those who were about to eat lunch at the
student union, and those who had just eaten lunch. We asked
participants to name the main food item they were about to eat (or
had just eaten), how much they wanted it, and how much they
liked it.7 We found that although participants’ liking remained
stable, as reflected in similar ratings both before (M  5.96) and
after eating (M  5.49; p  .95), participants’ wanting was
significantly higher before eating (M  5.51) than after eating
(M  4.73; interaction p  .01; see Figure 2). In other words,
removing the discrepancy between the dislike of hunger and the
enjoyment of (liking for) its satisfaction, removed the desire for
food while leaving intact the attitude toward (liking for) the food.
Two types of discrepancy. Two separate types of motivating
discrepancy may be distinguished, namely those related to promo-
tion and of prevention orientations (Higgins, 2012). In the case of
promotion, the probability of wanting, p(W), varies as a function
of the degree to which one’s relative liking for some future state of
affairs LF exceeds that of one’s liking for the present state LP. In
the case of prevention, p(W) varies as a function of the degree to
which the present state LP is liked better than some impending8
future state LF. In Higgins’ (2012) theory, prevention also de-
scribes the case where the present state represents a negative (i.e.,
disliked) departure from some, better liked, status quo. For in-
stance, dissonance theorists (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1957)
depict a situation where the performance of counterattitudinal
behavior creates a disliked state of dissonance and introduces the
goal of dissonance reduction, which in turn is served by the means
of attitude change.
Stated formally, let Relative Promotive Liking (RLPROM) 
f(LFLP)), and let Relative Preventive Liking (RLPREV) 
f(LP LF)), then probabilities of promotive Wanting, p(WPROM),
and of preventive Wanting, p(WPREV), respectively, could be
expressed simply as
p(WPROM) (RLPROM) (1)
p(WPREV) (RLPREV) (2)
Of interest too, even though the promotion and prevention wants
differ in regard to the valence of their desired states (i.e., 1 and 0,
respectively), their motivational salience appears to be similar. In
support of that notion, Reynolds and Berridge (2008) demonstrated
that desired and fearful environments evoke similar brain activity
in the nucleus accumbens.
Wanting, goal setting, and acting. Major motivational theo-
ries imply that an existing discrepancy suffices to engender be-
havior aimed at its removal (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1998;
Miller et al., 1960; Powers, 1973; Wiener, 1948). In this vein,
Carver and Scheier (2011) discuss a “discrepancy-reducing feed-
back loop . . . (whereby) if there is a discrepancy between the
(present and an intended state), the discrepancy is countered by
subsequent action” (p. 4, parentheses added).
We assume, however, that wanting in and of itself is not tanta-
mount to goal setting, hence it may not necessarily engender a goal
driven action. One may want the weather to be nice during one’s
vacation, wish the stock market to be bullish, or desire that a
parent’s operation will turn out well, without any of these defining
one’s goal. As noted earlier, apart from desirability of appreciable
enough magnitude, the object of one’s desire must possess attain-
ability through one’s actions (Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski et al.,
2014). Attainability through one’s action contributes to expectancy
that one can reach the desired state and a sufficiently high expec-
tancy may result in goal formation (Oettingen et al., 2001). On the
other hand, a lack of perceived attainability through one’s own
6 A special case of this is represented by a discrepancy between one’s
actual and desired attitude (DeMarree, Wheeler, Briñol, & Petty, 2014).
Such a discrepancy may contribute to the formation of a goal to remove the
discrepancy by replacing the actual by the desired attitude. In such an
instance, the actual attitude is less likely to serve as a basis for goal
formation. Indeed, DeMarree et al., 2014 find that where the discrepancy
between actual and desired attitudes is large the actual attitude is less likely
to predict behavior.
7 The liking measure consisted of an averaged response to five highly
correlated questions referring to the main food item participants were about
to eat (or had just eaten): (a) How good is it? (b) How tasty is it? (c) How
beneficial is it? (d) How pleasant is it? (e) How much do you like it? Want
was measured with the question: How much do you want to eat it right
now? Answers were recorded with 7-point Likert scales anchored appro-
priately at the ends.
8 In the case of prevention the negative future state should be perceived
as having an above threshold likelihood of occurring, otherwise no wanting
would occur. For instance, one may dislike getting wet, but not want to
carry an umbrella unless there is a high threat of rain.Figure 2. Liking and wanting of the meal.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
5ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
activities may result in the delegation of goal attainment to other
sources. Relevant to this point is research by Kay, Gaucher,
Napier, Callan, and Laurin (2008) showing that in the absence of
perceived control over outcomes, that is, of goals’ attainability via
one’s own actions, individuals tended to “outsource” the fulfill-
ment of their wants to external agency such as God or the gov-
ernment.
Granting sufficient degrees of desirability and attainability, a
goal may be formulated (Kruglanski et al., 2014) but even that
need not result in the initiation of (goal driven) behavior. First, as
already noted, a goal needs to be accessed or activated from
memory at a given moment (Bargh, 1990; Bargh et al., 2001;
Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Stroebe, van Koningsbruggen, Pa-
pies, & Aarts, 2013). A dormant goal that is not of current concern
is unlikely to promote action (Eitam & Higgins, 2010). Second, a
goal needs to be sufficiently dominant in a given context, so that
it is not overridden by other, more pressing concerns. Thus, we
assume that goals differ in their importance to the individual and
in case of goal conflict the more important goal takes precedence
over the less important one. A person on the way to a job interview
might fail to show up at the designated venue on learning that his
or her spouse fell ill, that her/his house caught fire, or that her or
his child went missing. One’s goals may be ordered according to
their hierarchy of importance to the individual (Kenrick, Griskevi-
cius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010; Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2010). For
instance, evolutionary (deep) goals such as survival or safety may
normally trump self-presentation, as when one drops the hot dish
from the oven while bringing it to the dinner guests. It is also true,
however, that in some circumstances a generally less important
goal may assert its dominance over a generally more important
goal. For instance, whereas normally survival may take precedence
over assertion of one’s social identity, when one’s group is se-
verely humiliated the individual may be prepared to risk life and
limb to redress the harm (Kruglanski, Belanger, et al., 2013;
Pyszczynski, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2015).
In other words, where a relative liking (RL) for a given state of
affairs is situationally activated, a want may be created that over-
rides other, less salient, concerns. In this vein, Custers and Aarts
(2005, 2007) demonstrated that priming affect (and hence RL)
associated with a given condition increases the dominance of the
correspondent goal, prompting relevant goal driven behaviors.
Similarly, Pessiglione et al. (2007) found that participants exerted
greater behavioral effort with a subliminal pound versus penny
reward cue on a given trial. Additionally, Shah, Friedman, and
Kruglanski (2002) showed that situationally induced commitment
to a focal goal (that renders it dominant) fosters “forgetting all
else,” that is, induces the inhibition of other contemporaneous
objectives (see also Huang & Bargh, 2014).
Means choice. Finally, even if a goal were dominant in a
given situation this does not mean that a specific goal relevant
behavior would be necessarily pursued. A behavior constitutes a
means to a goal, and there might exist other accessible means that
might be preferred by an actor in given circumstances. This raises
the question of criteria whereby a means to a goal is selected.
Given that an individual was able to carry out the activity that the
means entails, two essential criteria determine means selection,
namely those of (a) instrumentality and (b) supplementarity. The
instrumentality criterion refers to the principle that a means is
selected as a positive function of its perceived likelihood (behav-
ioral expectancy) of goal attainment (e.g., Labroo & Kim, 2009).
The supplementarity criterion refers to the principle that, all else
being equal, a means that promises to confer additional value
beyond the specific focal goal, would be selected over one that
confers lesser supplementary value. Evidence for the supplemen-
tarity principle comes from research on multifinality (for review of
relevant findings see Kruglanski, Kopetz et al., 2013) demonstrat-
ing that a means that uniquely serves several different objectives is
preferred over means that serves fewer objectives. A special case
of supplementarity arises where the behavior that serves an ulterior
end is additionally an end in itself. For instance, one may view
tennis as a means to the goal of fitness but also enjoy tennis for its
own sake, and so forth.
In a gist, then, attitudes seem to be quite remote from specific
behaviors, and in order for them to produce behavior several
“bridges” must be crossed. First, the attitude, or relative liking
needs to engender wanting. Second, the wanting (desirability)
needs to be conjoined to expected attainability, that is, the sense
that one would be able to fulfill one’s desire through one’s actions.
Lacking attainability, a want alone would not produce behavior.
Third, the desirability or attainability compound would need to be
of a sufficient magnitude to produce goal commitment. Fourth, the
goal would need to be currently activated; fifth, that goal would
need to be dominant in the situation rather than being overridden
by alternative objectives. Sixth, for a given behavior to be carried
out in specific circumstances it would need to be chosen as the
preferred means to the goal, resulting in the formation of a specific
implementation intention (Gollwitzer, 1999). These notions are
schematically represented in Figure 3 that depicts “a centralized
self-regulatory function that coordinates multiple goal pursuit”
(Fishbach, 2014, p. 143).
In this depiction, attitudes constitute components of the Relative
Liking terms, whether of the promotive or preventive variety (i.e.,
RLPROM and RLPREV). Beyond some threshold of magnitude,
these translate into the Want (W) ingredients of several currently
active goals, each of which incorporates in addition the essential,
attainability, components (A). The goals are processed and com-
pared via the central self-regulatory function, and as a result, a
given goal is accorded dominance, becoming the focal goal in the
situation. That goal may be associated with several behavioral
means of which the most appropriate (i.e., the most apparently
effective, parsimonious, or multifinal) is selected for implementa-
tion.9 As with goal selection, means selection and the formation of
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) is carried out via a
central self-regulatory process whose extent may depend on the
individual’s mental resources.
According to the present theory then, the presence of attitude
behavior consistency in a given domain is contingent on the
fulfillment of several critical conditions. Specifically, a chain of
events needs to occur, each link of which is necessary for the
attitude in question to prompt a specific behavior. To state it
9 Thus, we assume Relative Liking to be a causal antecedent of Wanting,
Wanting, and Attainability to be the causal antecedents of goal formation,
and goal dominance to be a causal antecedent of behavioral (i.e., means)
choice. No order of precedence is assumed to characterize the Want versus
Attainability relation, however. That is, an individual might be cognizant of
the attainability of a given state of affairs either before or after she or he
was cognizant of its desirability.
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6 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
formally, the conditional probability of a specific behavior (bx)
given an attitude L (toward an object or a state of affairs), p(bx/RL)
can be expressed as function of the concatenation of several
conditional probabilities, namely (a) the probability of wanting
given the attitude or liking in question p(W/RL), (b) the probability
of goal formation given a state of wanting, p(G/W), (c) the
probability of the specific goal being focal (dominant) given the
set of currently active goals, p(GF/Gset), and (d) the probability of
the specific behavior (bx) being selected as a means to the focal
goal out of the set of currently accessible means to that end,
p(bx/Mset). These relations are expressed in Equation 3.
p(bx/RL) f [p(W/RL) x p(G/W) x p(GF/Gset) x p(bx/Mset)]
(3)
Addressing the Attitude Behavior Issue: A Tale of
Two Approaches
In the sections that follow we examine the two major research
paradigms on attitude-behavior consistency and consider their
relation to the present model. As noted earlier, these are the (a)
attitude strength, and (b) behavior focus research programs. The
first of these approaches explores the thesis that attitudes relate to
behavior as function of their (variously defined) strength (cf.
Krosnick & Petty, 1995). The second submits that general atti-
tudes toward objects are unlikely to relate to behavior, and that a
more effective strategy is to focus on attitudes toward the behavior
itself (Ajzen, 1985, 2012; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 2010).
As will be seen, both approaches differ in several major respects
from the present theoretical perspective. For one, they continue to
highlight the attitude construct as a major predictor of behavior. In
contrast, we assign that role to goals and to perceived goal-means
relations. Second, both traditional paradigms focus on attitudes in
the absolute, that is, on liking for the object as such or liking for
the behavior in itself; in contrast our model emphasizes the notion
of relative liking and views the discrepancy between present and
future states as crucial. Third, the traditional approaches neglect
the chain of contingencies that span the chasm between an attitude
and a behavior. In contrast, the present “Rocky Road” model views
the sequence of contingent transformations from attitudes to wants,
to goals, and ultimately to behavioral means as fundamental to
understanding how human behavior unfolds.
The Attitude Strength Paradigm
Following Converse’s (1970) oft-cited observation that some
voters’ responses to attitude scales are unstable (reflecting the so
called “nonattitudes”), a great deal research was devoted to the
concept of attitude strength and the idea that only sufficiently
strong attitudes drive behavior. Attitude strength, defined as “the
extent to which attitudes manifest the qualities of durability and
impactfulness,” is an umbrella term encompassing a panoply of
constructs (Krosnick & Petty, 1995, p. 3). The main strength-
related constructs to have received empirical attention are attitude
extremity, direct experience, accessibility, certainty, ambivalence,
importance, knowledge, intensity, interest, latitudes of rejection
and noncommitment, and affective-cognitive consistency (Kros-
Figure 3. Centralized self-regulatory function.
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7ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
nick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993; Krosnick &
Petty, 1995). Considerable research has supported the claims that
these indices of attitude strength are positively related to behavior.
Examples include studies on attitude accessibility (Fazio, Chen,
McDonel, & Sherman, 1982; Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 1989;
Fazio & Williams, 1986), certainty (Davidson, Yantis, Norwood,
& Montano, 1985; Sample & Warland, 1973), extremity (Fazio &
Zanna, 1978; Petersen & Dutton, 1975), direct experience (Fazio
& Zanna, 1978; Schlegel & DiTecco, 1982), affective-cognitive
consistency (Norman, 1975; Schlegel & DiTecco, 1982), knowl-
edge (Davidson et al., 1985; Fabrigar et al., 2006; Kallgren &
Wood, 1986), latitudes of noncommitment (Sherif, Kelly, Rodgers,
Sarup, & Tittler, 1973), importance (Farc & Sagarin, 2009; Jaccard
& Becker, 1985; Schuman & Presser, 1981), vested interest (Si-
vacek & Crano, 1982), and ambivalence (Armitage & Conner,
2000; DeMarree et al., 2014).
From the present perspective, measures of attitude strength are
qualifiers of the basic liking concept. That is, one’s liking may be
based on direct experience, and may be more or less accessible,
extreme, confident, and so forth. The stronger the liking in some
sense (of a hoped-for future state, or dislike of an impending future
state relative to the present state) the greater the RLPROM or
RLPREV and thus the more intense the desire (Want) to approach
the future state or avoid it as the case may be.
The important point is, however, that no matter how strong the
attitude in any of the above senses, it would fail to drive behavior
if any of the terms of Equation 3 above went missing. According
to the present model, then, though attitude strength at some above-
threshold magnitude is necessary to engender wanting, it is insuf-
ficient for that purpose if not discrepant enough from liking for the
present state—and even more so if, for instance, the future state
was deemed unattainable, or the goal based on the wanting was
overridden by another objective.
Indeed, a close inspection of each of the many attitude strength
studies demonstrating its relation to behavior inevitably reveals
unarticulated goals lurking in the background. Without those
goals, and their situational dominance over other possible concerns
the behavior in question is highly unlikely to have taken place. Let
us consider some examples.
Attitudes based on direct experience. Fazio and colleagues
(e.g., Fazio et al., 1982; Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978; Regan &
Fazio, 1977) identified direct personal experience with an object
as an important moderator of the attitude-behavior consistency.
Indeed, experimental evidence gathered by the authors suggests
that individuals who acquired their attitudes through direct expe-
rience with the attitude objects behave (toward those objects) more
consistently with those attitudes than persons whose experience
with the objects was indirect.
For example, in a study by Regan and Fazio (1977), participants
were given five pages of puzzle problems and asked to work
through them (in the direct experience condition) or were pre-
sented the same puzzles without having to complete them (in the
indirect experience condition). Afterward, participants’ attitudes
toward the puzzle problems were measured, and they were given
an opportunity to work on any problems they wished in a 15-min
“free-play” session (where the behavioral measure was taken).
Regan and Fazio (1977) found that participants who formed atti-
tudes toward the puzzles through direct experience behaved more
consistently with their attitudes (i.e., spent more time playing with
the puzzles they had evaluated positively, and less time with ones
they evaluated less positively) compared with participants who
formed their attitudes through indirect experience.
From the present perspective, it is likely that in the Regan and
Fazio (1977) study, and other research of this type, participants’
attitudes toward the attitude objects were indeed stronger (e.g.,
more intense or stable)10 and that this contributed to a greater
sense of wanting to engage or to avoid engaging with the objects
in question. Moreover, participants’ sense of attainability of suc-
cess may well have differed in the direct and indirect experience
conditions affecting goal formation. Finally, in the free-play pe-
riod of this study, working on some problem appears to have been
the overriding goal in the situation whose pursuit was enabled by
the available puzzles, hence promoting engagement. According
to the present analysis, if any of these additional elements was
missing, for example, if participants were tired of (or satiated with)
puzzle solving, or if a different, more important goal was intro-
duced into the situation, direct experience would be unlikely to
promote behavior in those circumstances.
In brief then, a confident, stable attitude (one that might derive
from direct experience) defines a liking component that often
(though not invariably) may result in a desire (wanting); in turn,
wanting might give rise to goal formation and the goal could drive
a perceived behavioral means to its attainment. In that sense, direct
experience could be indeed relevant to the attitude-behavior rela-
tionship. As we have seen, however, beyond liking, however
strong or stable, several additional conditions would need to be
met; a number of further “ducks” would need to be “in a row” (i.e.,
wanting, goal formation, means selection) for an experience-based
attitude to actually eventuate in a behavior.
Accessibility. Fazio’s early work on direct-experience (Fazio
et al., 1978, 1982; Regan & Fazio, 1977) evolved into a more
elaborate framework, namely the MODE model that accords a
major role to the construct of attitude accessibility (alluded to
already in the authors’ earlier work, cf., Fazio et al., 1982). The
MODE model focuses on a distinction between two general classes of
attitude-to-behavior processes–spontaneous versus deliberative–
and considers Motivation and Opportunity as the major determi-
nants of which of the two is likely to operate.
In the spontaneous process, attitudes are automatically activated
from memory upon the individual’s encounter with the attitude
objects. The attitude influences how the object is construed—
either directly (i.e., affecting the object’s immediate appraisal) or
indirectly (as when it biases perceptions of the object’s particular
qualities). In contrast, the deliberative process is characterized by
weighing the costs and benefits of a particular action. The delib-
erative process is effortful and an individual must be motivated to
engage in it as well as to have the opportunity (i.e., the time and
the resources) to do so. Fazio (1990) characterizes the spontaneous
process as relatively “theory driven” or top-down, in that the
behavior is assumed to follow from activated (attitudinal) con-
structs. By contrast, the deliberative process is assumed to be “data
driven” in that the behavior is assumed to be determined by a
relatively laborious consideration of situationally present features.
10 For example, because participants trusted their own epistemic author-
ity or gut feelings concerning their liking or dislike toward the experienced
objects.
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8 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
In general, the MODE model treats motivation and opportunity
as conditions necessary to counteract the “mindless” influence of
automatically activated attitudes. In this vein, Fazio and Olson
(2014) suggest that an “individual must be motivated to engage in
the effortful analysis” (p. 3), that is, to actively deliberate about
how to behave rather than allowing for automatically activated
attitudes to guide behavior. They further state that
One might be motivated to gauge the appropriateness, or even counter
the influence, of an automatically activated attitude. That motivation
might stem from an enhanced desire for accuracy . . . a sense of
accountability . . . a concern with social desirability . . . or . . .
motivations to control prejudiced reactions. (Fazio & Olson, 2014,
p. 3)
From the present perspective, both the spontaneous and the
deliberative cases are governed by the same attitude to behavior
process elaborated herein (see Equation 3). One difference be-
tween them is that that in the spontaneous case, previously formed
attitudes are activated from memory whereas in the deliberative
case attitudes are constructed from an elaborative consideration of
relevant information (i.e., concerning costs and benefits of given
states of affairs). Another difference between them is that produc-
tion of “spontaneous,” or “automatic” behavior does not require
much cognitive capacity or energetic resources whereas produc-
tion of deliberative behavior does require these (cf. Kruglanski et
al., 2012). More important, from the present perspective, however,
regardless of whether activated from memory or constructed de
noveau, or whether requiring considerable or meager resources,
the relative liking or disliking of objects or states must morph into
wanting and wanting must morph into goal formation before it
may impel behavior.
Early evidence that automatically accessible behaviors can drive
behavior comes from research by Fazio et al. (1989). In this study,
the authors first asked participants to rate their liking toward 100
products and measured their response latencies. Then they pre-
sented participants with a subset of 10 products and allowed them
to choose five of them as gifts. Their findings showed that laten-
cies of liking scores predicted whether a product would be chosen
as well as the order in which it was chosen. In other words, for
positive liking scores the faster were the liking responses toward a
product, the more likely the participants were to choose it; for
negative liking scores, the opposite was the case—the faster the
(dis)liking responses, the less likely the participants were to choose
the product in question.
Again, accessibility of liking may attest to strength of attitudes
toward the products and relative liking (to having the product vs.
lacking it) should well translate into a degree of wanting the
products in question. Furthermore, attainability of those products
was well nigh assured by the experimental procedures setting the
conditions for wanting to evolve into goal formation. Finally, as no
alternative goals appeared paramount in this experimental context,
the goal driven behavior (choice of the more liked products) was
fairly certain to appear. Had the products been made unattainable,
however, or had the liking-wanting link been severed (e.g., by
satiation) accessible attitudes should be less likely to predict be-
havior.
Empirical Study 3: Attainability moderates accessibility ef-
fects on attitude-behavior relations. We carried out an empir-
ical study to test the idea that accessibility effects on attitude
behavior relations are moderated by the degree to which the actor’s
goal is attainable through the behavior.
Ninety-four students of “La Sapienza” University of Rome
(65.9% female, mean age  23.50, SD  4.63) took part in the
study. Participants completed all tasks on a computer with Inquisit
version 3. Data from four participants who made inconsistent
responses were not included in the analyses. Note that when data
from these participants were included in the analyses, results did
not change.
Attitude accessibility and valence. Participants were pre-
sented with names of 16 film genres (e.g., thriller, drama, action,
etc.) and were instructed to indicate whether they liked or disliked
the genre. Reaction time (RT) was measured; in the analyses a
logarithmic transformation was applied to this data. This repre-
sented the measure of attitude accessibility; lower RTs indicated
higher accessibility. Participants were then presented with the
names of the same genres and were asked to indicate their liking
on a 1–7 scale; this represented the measure of attitude valence.
Desirability and attainability. Participants were then pre-
sented with a series of math problems; these problems were
pretested to ensure that they were aversive, but not overwhelm-
ingly aversive. Participants were then presented with a series of
two randomly ordered statements that tapped their preferred choice
between watching a relatively popular film genre (Thriller), or to
continue solving math problems. Participants indicated their pref-
erence for each choice on a scale of 1–7. The manipulated likeli-
hood of being assigned to either watch a film or continue solving
math problems depended on the experimental condition to which
participants were assigned.
In the high attainability condition (n  30), participants were
presented with the following information: (a) “If you choose to
watch a film from the genre THRILLER, you will have a 70%
chance of being assigned to watch the video and a 30% chance of
doing more math” (b) “If you choose to do the math task, you have
a 100% chance of being assigned to it.”
In the low attainability condition (n  33), participants were
presented with the following information: (a) “If you choose to
watch a film from the genre THRILLER, you will have a 30%
chance of being assigned to watch the video and a 70% chance of
doing more math” (b) “If you choose to do the math task, you have
a 100% chance of being assigned to it.”
In the third condition (control; n  31), participants were
presented with options to watch a film from the Thriller genre, or
to continue to solve math problems. Attainability information was
not mentioned in this condition.
Results. Data from participants who made inconsistent re-
sponses on the attitude accessibility task (i.e., like or dislike of film
genres) and the attitude valence task were removed (e.g., if a
participant indicated like of a particular genre in the accessibility
task, then rated it below the midpoint of the attitude valence task,
see Fazio et al., 1989, for a similar procedure). Data from three
participants in the low attainability and one participant in the
control condition were removed for these reasons.
Preference manipulation check. To assess if participants
found Thrillers to be preferable to the math task, we assessed the
desirability for each across each condition. As expected, mean
desirability for thriller was higher (4.57) than mean desirability for
math (2.64), F(1, 87)  50.28; p .0001.
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9ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
Control condition. Data from the control condition (n  30)
were used to assess the two-way Accessibility  Valence interac-
tion. This sample did not include data from one participant who
made an inconsistent response. Main effect of Attitude accessibil-
ity and attitude valence and their interaction were entered as
predictors in this analysis. Both accessibility and valence attitude
variables were standardized and the interaction term was based on
the standardized scores. Results from the control condition are
presented on Table 1.
Valence and accessibility: Main effects. Only the Valence
main effect was significant. Specifically, more positive attitudes
toward Thriller were associated with greater preference for this
film genre.
Two-way interaction. The Valence  Accessibility interac-
tion was significant and in the expected direction. Simple slope
analysis show that the positive effect of attitude valence on pref-
erence for Thriller was strongest at high accessibility (b  1.66,
t  3.34, p  .002); preference was highest at high valence and
high accessibility. The effect of attitude valence on preference at
low accessibility was very weak (b  .14, t  .27, p  .791;
see Figure 4). These findings conceptually replicate the classic
Fazio et al. (1989) study.
Experimental condition. To test the attitude Accessibility 
Attitude Valence  Attainability interaction, data from the high
and low attainability conditions were analyzed jointly (n  60).
This sample did not include data from three participants (all in the
low attainability condition) who made an inconsistent response.
Main effects of Attitude Accessibility (standardized score), Atti-
tude Valence (standardized score), and a contrast code for the
Attainability condition (1 low attainability and 1 high attainabil-
ity), as well as the two and three-way interactions between vari-
ables were entered as predictors in the analysis. Results from the
experimental condition are presented in Table 2.
Attitude valence, accessibility, and attainability: Main effects.
Only the main effect for attitude valence was significant in that
more positive attitudes were associated with higher desire.
Two-way interactions. The Attitude Valence  Accessibility
interaction was significant and in the expected direction; the effect
of attitude valence on preference was strongest at high accessibil-
ity. The attitude Valence  Attainability was also significant;
Valence had a stronger effect on preference in the high Attainabil-
ity condition.
Three-way interaction. More important, the critical three-way
interaction between Valence, Accessibility, and Attainability was
significant (p .009). Decomposing this effect, it is found that the
two-way Attitude Valence  Accessibility interaction was signif-
icant (b  1.11, t  3.51, p  .0009) in the high attainability
condition, but not in the low attainability condition (b  .08,
t  .27, p  .787; see Figures 5 and 6.)
Specifically, simple slope analyses show that in the high attain-
ability condition, attitude valence was positively and significantly
(b  2.63, t  4.33, p  .0001) associated with preference for
watching a thriller at high attitude accessibility. Preference for
thriller was particularly low when valence was low and accessi-
bility high. There was no significant effect of attitude valence,
however, under low attitude accessibility (b  .41, t  .98, p 
.331).
In summary, findings reported above support the present anal-
ysis whereby accessible attitudes’ relation to behavior depends on
a goal’s attainability by the behavior. In the present study, acces-
sible attitudes were translated into behavioral preferences only
where attainability was relatively high and not where it was low.
Full fledged MODE model. The full-fledged MODE model
was tested in a number of previous studies. Hofmann and Friese
(2008), for instance, investigated the effects of dietary constraint
and resource capacity, manipulated via alcohol intake, in their joint
effect on candy consumption. Whereas dietary restraint was the
more important predictor of candy consumption among sober
Table 1
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis in the
Control Condition
B SE t
Valence .76 .35 2.19
Accessibility .53 .43 1.24
Valence  Accessibility .90 .37 2.43
 p  .05.
Table 2
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis in the
Experimental Condition
B SE t
Valence .87 .26 3.37
Accessibility .03 .25 .11
Attainability .22 .23 .95
Valence  Accessibility .51 .22 2.31
Accessibility  Attainability .24 .25 .95
Valence  Attainability .66 .26 2.52
Valence  Accessibility  Attainability .60 .22 2.69
 p  .05.  p  .01.
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Figure 4. Desirability of watching a thriller film as a function of attitude
valence and accessibility (Control condition). See the online article for the
color version of this figure.
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10 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
participants, alcohol intake enhanced the relation between prior
attitudes toward candy and candy consumption. Similarly, prefer-
ence for candy bars versus apples (as assessed by a personalized
IAT) predicted choice behavior when participants had been made
to feel happy, but less so when they were made to feel sad. In the
latter condition, participants’ beliefs about the attributes of candy
bars versus apples proved more influential (Holland, de Vries,
Hermsen, & van Knippenberg, 2012). Finally, individual differ-
ences in working memory capacity also were shown to play an
important role in self-regulation (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese,
Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008). Essentially, automatic attitudes toward a
given temptation more strongly influenced behavior for individu-
als with lower working memory capacity, than for individuals with
higher capacity.
From the present theoretical perspective, chronic accessibility11
of attitudes (i.e., latency of the attitudinal response) toward objects
(e.g., candy bars that they did not currently possess) attesting to
strength of the attitudes in question could readily translate into
degree of wanting them which given the assured attainability
might well evolve into goals of obtaining and consuming them
upon obtainment. Too, given sufficient cognitive resources, an
alternative superordinate goal, for example, of dieting, could be
deliberatively activated and thus override the goal of consumption.
Of interest, Fishbach, Friedman, and Kruglanski (2003) found that
successful self-regulators activate such superordinate goal from
memory immediately upon encountering a temptation (e.g., a
candy bar for dieters), which mediates their ability to resist the
temptation. The latter finding suggests that the self-regulation
process can be automatized and liberated from its dependency on
resources.
In summary, research cited in support of the MODE model is
interpretable within the present framework in which—when com-
bined with perceived attainability—attitudes toward objects may
induce desires that contribute to formation of goals that (if dom-
inant), may promote relevant goal-driven behavior. This analysis
implies, moreover, that whether automatically activated or re-
trieved upon a more elaborative consideration, attitudes would not
lead to behavior if the relevant attitude objects are not more
positively or negatively valued relative to the actor’s present states
(prompting promotive or preventive wants) or if they are unattain-
able. For instance, an accessible attitude toward candy (e.g., ac-
complished by attitudinal priming or measured via response la-
tency) may not lead to behavioral choice if one has already eaten
enough sweets or if the likelihood of getting it was low (e.g., the
candy was displayed in a store window during after hours).
Importance, certainty, and relevance. Holland, Verplanken,
and Van Knippenberg (2002) investigated the role of attitude
strength, measured by the aspects of importance, certainty, and
relevance, as moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship. They
hypothesized, and found, that strong attitudes toward an object (the
Greenpeace organization) were more likely to lead to an attitude-
related behavior (donating to Greenpeace) than weak attitudes. In
the first study session, participants’ attitudes toward Greenpeace
were assessed, as was the strength of those attitudes. In the second
session, participants were paid 10 Dutch guilders and asked
whether they wanted to donate some of this money to Greenpeace.
It was found that stronger attitudes predicted the amount of dona-
tion, whereas weaker attitudes did not. Once again, in this study
attitude strength is likely to have evolved into the desire to donate,
and given that the attainability of donation was assured, partici-
pants may have formed the goal to donate, which in turn drove
their donating behavior. However, regardless of the strength of
their attitude toward Greenpeace, participants would not presum-
ably form the goal to donate—and would not subsequently act on
that goal—if their expectancy of being able to do so was nonex-
istent (defining a lack of attainability), for example, or if they had
11 In that attitude accessibility was measured before the behavioral
options were presented.
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Figure 5. Desirability of watching a thriller film as a function of attitude
valence and accessibility (High Attainability condition). See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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Figure 6. Desirability of watching a thriller film as a function of attitude
valence and accessibility (Low Attainability condition). See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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11ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
just made a donation and had no more money to spare,12 or if their
prior donation eliminated the discrepancy (hence the Want) be-
tween one’s positive attitude to Greenpeace, and one’s lack of
expression of that support.
Alternative attitude-strength studies could be similarly inter-
preted: In all such cases attitude strength did not seem to impact
behavior directly but rather to have contributed to a state of
wanting that when combined with attainability produced a goal
that drove instrumental acts. Because attitudes may ultimately
form a part of goals the same aspects of attitude strength, for
example, extremity, accessibility, confidence, and so forth, that
pertain to attitudes would also characterize goals that are based on
the attitudes in question. However, as we have argued throughout,
object attitudes alone are not enough and the subsequent links in
the chain (depicted in Equation 3) need to be realized for behavior
to occur.
Individual differences in attitude-behavior consistency.
Closely related to the notion of attitude strength are individual
differences in the attitude-behavior relation. The two most often
discussed such differences are those of self-monitoring (Snyder,
1983) and self awareness (Wicklund, 1982). We discuss them
briefly in turn.
Self-monitoring. Snyder and his colleagues (cf. Snyder &
Kendzierski, 1982; Snyder & Swann, 1976) theorized and found
that low monitors whose behavior is guided by internal cues,
exhibit substantially greater attitude-behavior covariation than
high monitors whose behavior is guided more by situational cir-
cumstances. This is likely because low (vs. high) self monitors
attitudes are more chronically accessible (Higgins, 1996). Conse-
quently, low monitors’ attitudes are more likely to be translated
into goals and hence drive goal relevant behavior. Instead, high
monitors’ goals are more likely to be formed on the basis of
situationally primed attitudes giving rise to correspondent goals
different from those based on their previously measured attitudes.
Consistent with this analysis, Ajzen, Timko, and White (1982)
showed that the difference in attitude-behavior consistency be-
tween high and low self-monitoring individuals was located in the
relation between intentions and behavior. While the attitude-
intention relation was similar for both groups, low self-monitors
exhibited significantly stronger intention-behavior correlations
than did high self-monitors, presumably because the latter had a
different goal activated in the situation prompting a different
behavioral intention.
Of particular interest too, Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) found
that when the behavior was equally relevant to high and low self
monitors, representing a strong goal based on the measured atti-
tudes, the difference between them disappeared in that now the
high self monitors too acted consistently with their attitudes.
Self awareness. According to Wicklund (1982) individuals
high in self awareness should exhibit greater attitude-behavior
consistency than ones low in self awareness. Specifically (p. 157)
highly aware individuals are attuned to their attitudes which has “a
motivational consequence: If it is difficult to remove oneself from
self-aware condition, then the person can be expected to show
increase in consistency.” Just as with low self monitoring, high self
awareness, or high private self awareness (Froming, Walker, &
Lopyan, 1982; Scheier, 1980) represent chronic accessibility of
one’s attitudes likely to transform into goals that drive behaviors.
As Carver and Scheier (1998) aptly summarized it: “Focusing on
the private versus public aspects of the self is nothing more than
taking one package of goals as salient, rather than another package
of goals. In either case, the goals that are taken up and attended to
are the ones that become manifest in actions” (p. 119).
Refocusing on Behavior: Ajzen and Fishbein’s TRA
and TPB Models
A unique and highly influential approach to the attitude behav-
ior issue is represented in Fishbein and Ajzen’s theories of rea-
soned action (TRA) and of planned behavior (TPB; e.g., Ajzen,
1985, 2012; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, 2010). Their essential argu-
ment was two-pronged. (a) First they proposed that general object
attitudes, of the kind typically addressed by attitude researchers
(e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1981; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 2007;
Thurstone, 1931) are in principle unrelated to specific behaviors
and hence they should be relinquished as behavioral predictors. (b)
Instead, they proposed that focusing on attitudes toward the be-
havior provides a more effective method of behavioral prediction.
In what follows, we examine both arguments in greater detail and
discuss them from the present theoretical perspective.
On general attitudes and specific behaviors. In most treat-
ments of the attitude concept, its referent was an object, an issue or
a state of affairs. In this vein, Wicker (1969) defined attitudes as
“evaluative feelings of pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, with
regard to particular objects” (p. 42). Examples of attitude objects
included in Wicker’s (1969) review range from attitudes toward
jobs and minority group members to attitudes toward breastfeed-
ing, public housing, and student cheating. And the issue of
attitude-behavior consistency typically referred to the question of
whether such attitudes toward objects instigate relevant (approach
or avoidance) behaviors toward those objects. Examples of such
behaviors include job performance and absences, as function of
attitudes toward the organization, willingness to provide service to
a minority group member, as function of attitudes toward that
group, applying for public housing as function of attitudes to
public housing, and cheating on a self-graded exam, as function of
one’s attitude toward honesty (Wicker, 1969). In all those in-
stances, the general attitude toward the object is clearly concep-
tually separate from behavior toward the object, and the question,
again, was whether the former gives rise to the latter.
In a creative break from that tradition, Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975, 2010; Ajzen, 1985, 2012) proposed instead to focus on
attitude toward the behavior as a more reasonable marker of
behavior’s occurrence. According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010):
“We cannot expect strong relations between general attitudes to-
ward an object and any given behavior directed toward that object”
(pp. 258–259). According to the authors then, a general attitude
toward an object will predict an aggregate of behaviors relevant to
the attitude but not any specific behavior (Ajzen, 2012; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 2010). Empirical support for that assertion comes from
studies by Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) on religious behavior, Wei-
12 Relevant to this point, Holland et al. (2002) excluded from the
analysis members of the Greenpeace organization who did not donate
money. These participants (n  5) had a good reason not to donate money,
as they already paid membership fees” (p. 872). Thus, the authors actually
excluded from their study participants who did not have the goal to
donate—presumably because including them would change their results.
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12 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
gel and Newman (1976) on environmental behavior, and Werner
(1978) on abortion activism, to be discussed later.
Behavior focus. Instead of addressing general object atti-
tudes, Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) TRA
and Ajzen’s (1985) subsequent TPB, center on the construct of
behavioral intention, assumed to constitute the direct antecedent of
actual behavior. In turn, behavioral intention is determined by (a)
attitude toward the behavior, which constitutes the sole attitudinal
component in the TPB/TRA models (Ajzen, 2012), (b) subjective
norms, and (c) perceived behavioral control. These factors are
themselves determined by underlying behavioral, normative, and
control beliefs. According to the TPB then, by measuring attitudes
to the behavior, perceived norms, and perceived behavioral con-
trol, we should be able to predict intentions to perform a single
behavior, which in turn is highly correlated with the behavior’s
actual occurrence. We elaborate on these concepts in what follows.
Attitude toward the behavior (AB) reflects the degree to which
performance of the behavior is positively or negatively valued;
such attitude is assumed to vary as function of the sum total of the
behavior’s believed instrumentalities to different outcomes
weighted by their respective desirabilities. For example, attitude
toward running may depend on one’s beliefs in the likelihood that
running facilitates (a) cardiac health, (b) weight loss, (c) stress
reduction, and so forth; times the subjective desirability (values) of
each of these outcomes.
Perceived behavioral control (PBC) refers to people’s general
expectations regarding the degree to which they are capable of
performing a given behavior, the extent to which they have the
requisite resources and believe they can overcome whatever ob-
stacles they may encounter. Whether these resources and obstacles
are internal or external to the person is immaterial (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 2010).13
PBC is determined by salient control beliefs, which are elicited
by asking participants to list the factors they believe would enable
them to perform the behavior as well as factors that are likely to
impede its performance. For instance, in a study on mountain
climbing (Ajzen & Driver, 1991), participants listed having good
weather, not having proper equipment, living near mountains,
lacking skills and knowledge for mountain climbing.
Finally, subjective norm (SN) is defined as a perceived social
pressure to engage or not engage in a given behavior. It is deter-
mined by the total set of accessible normative beliefs concerning
the expectations of important others (injunctive norms) and de-
scriptive norms (how important others behave). As can be seen
then, all three proposed determinants of behavioral intentions are
focused on a specific behavior, including its evaluation or likabil-
ity (attitude toward the behavior), perceived ability to execute it
(i.e., perceived behavioral control), and the degree to which the
behavior is normative or not.
Empirical support for the TPB model has been extensive and
wide ranging. Its bulk was summarized in several meta-analyses.
Some of these were general and cut across broad swathes of
different behaviors (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Notani, 1998);
others focused on specific behavior-types (e.g., condom use, Al-
barracin, Johnson, Fishbein, & Muellerleile, 2001; health behavior,
Cooke, & French, 2008). In Armitage and Conner’s (2001) meta-
analysis, for example, the multiple correlation of attitude, subjec-
tive norm and perceived behavioral control accounted for 39% of
the variance in behavioral intentions. And in a meta-analysis of
studies on condom use, correlation of attitudes and norms ex-
plained 49% of the variance (Albarracin et al., 2001).
What Drives Behavioral Intentions? A View From a
Goal Systemic Bridge
Ajzen’s and Fishbein theories of reasoned action and of planned
behavior have been immensely influential14 and of practical utility
in predicting specific behaviors. However, the present conceptual
perspective may importantly complement their models by eluci-
dating the psychological processes that must transpire in order that
attitudes toward objects and attitudes toward specific behaviors
translate into actions.
In a gist, we suggest that TPBs behavior-focus neglects to
explicitly consider that behavior is goal driven.15 That is, behav-
iors typically constitute means to goal attainment, and it is goal
pursuit that drives behavior in the first place (cf., Huang & Bargh,
2014). It follows that neither attitude toward a behavior, nor
subjective norm nor perceived control would predict behavioral
intentions if the goal served by the behavior was not activated.
From the present perspective then, the TPB reverses the natural
order of things and puts the (behavioral) “cart” before the “horse”
(of goal pursuit). Accordingly, we propose to reinstate general
object attitudes as important contributors to goal formation, and to
attenuate the behavior focus of Fishbein and Ajzen’s models. In
what follows, we examine these notions in greater detail.
Can general object-attitudes drive specific behaviors?
Consider the relation between a general attitude (A) toward an
object and a specific behavior (B) toward it. Assuming that liking
or disliking toward an object culminated in a goal to attain or avoid
it such goal might be attainable via different behavioral means.
This situation is known as one of equifinality (Heider, 1958;
Kruglanski et al., 2002). If a highly diverse set of means was
entertained by the actor, it might be difficult to predict what
particular behavior she will undertake in the service of the goal, a
difficulty seemingly supportive of Ajzen and Fishbein’s objection
to the use of general attitudes as predictors of behavior. However,
note that the difficulty here is not immanent, or inevitable in the
13 The TPB notion of perceived behavioral control (PBC) is conceptu-
ally distinct from the notion of goal attainability. As noted above, PBC
refers to one’s ability to carry out a specific behavior, whereas goal
attainability refers to one’s general expectancy of being able to accomplish
a given goal through one’s actions. For instance, attainability may be
affected by one’s general sense of efficacy (Bandura, 1993) or an incre-
mental mindset (Dweck, 2006) not having to do with a specific behavior.
14 According to Nosek et al.’s (2010) intuitive guide (http://projectimplicit
.net/nosek/papers/citations/citedarticles.html) articles with above 3,000 ci-
tations count as having “transformational impact.” In these terms, three of
the Ajzen and Fishbein articles can claim to have exerted transformational
impact, notably Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) with 11,300 citations, Ajzen
and Fishbein (1980) with 9,824 citations, and Ajzen (1991) with 7,667
citations.
15 Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) do mention the goal concept, in the context
of suggesting that behavior is more predictable, and hence more amenable
to study, than goal attainment. As they put it “Attainment of a goal depends
not only on the person’s behavior but also on the other factors over which
the person may have little or no control” (p. 57), therefore: “as a general
rule, intentions will usually be better predictors of behaviors than of goal
attainment” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 58). However, our present concern
is not whether goals are attained, but rather whether behavior is goal driven
and, therefore, predictable from goals active in a situation.
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13ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
relation between general object attitudes (transformed into goals)
and specific behaviors. Indeed, there can be cases where the goal
object is best attained by a specific habitual means (Wood & Neal,
2007). In those instances, general object attitudes could in fact be
highly related to specific behaviors, albeit via mediation of goals
based on the attitudes in question. For instance, some individuals’
positive attitude toward fitness could translate into their adopting
the fitness goal, in turn perceived as best served by swimming.
Though, generally speaking, running, weight training, and judo
could also be perceived as fitness related, for the individuals in
question they might not be associated with the fitness goal, in
which case the relation between individuals’ attitude toward fit-
ness and swimming would not be significantly enhanced by an
aggregate incorporating also those other behaviors. Moreover, in
some cases a positive relation between a fitness attitude and
swimming could appear alongside a negative relation between that
attitude and running; for example, an individual who feels very
positive about fitness could choose to spend all of his or her time
swimming, which would leave him/her with hardly any time at all
for running. In such a case, the correlation between the attitude and
the aggregate containing both swimming and running would be
lower than the correlation between the attitude and swimming
alone.
Empirical Study 4: General attitudes can drive specific
behaviors. To investigate these matters empirically, we re-
cruited one hundred and four MTurkers (43 females).16
Attitude. Participants rated their attitude toward “being in
shape” on four 11-point scales ranging from 5 to 5, with the
endpoints marked “bad-good,” “harmful-beneficial,” “foolish-
wise,” and “unpleasant-pleasant.” Cronbach’s 	 for the four atti-
tude items was 0.89.
Goal. Participants answered three questions about the extent
to which being in shape is their current goal: “Please rate the extent
to which being in shape is your current goal,” “How likely do you
think it is that you will be in shape in the next few months?”, and
“How important is it to you to be in shape in the next few
months?” Participants responded to these items on an 11-point
scale ranging from 0 to 10. Cronbach’s 	 for the three goal items
was 0.80. The order of the goal and attitude questions was ran-
domized across participants to minimize any potential order ef-
fects.
Behaviors. Participants had to indicate how often they per-
formed each of 24 fitness activities (e.g., biking, running, weight-
lifting) on an 8-point scale ranging from “never” to “daily.”
Relations between variables. Our main dependent variable
was the frequency of the most often-used behavior for each par-
ticipant, viewed here as the most preferred means to the goal of
fitness. The relevant descriptive statistics and correlations are
displayed in Table 3. As may be seen, the correlation between
attitudes and goals is highly significant, consistent with our notion
that (relative) attitudes constitute the evaluative component of
goals. It is also noteworthy that attitudes are significantly related to
each participant’s most preferred behavioral means to fitness,
although the relation between goals and most preferred behavioral
means is stronger (albeit not significantly so). Also of interest,
both attitudes and goals are related to (each participant’s) aggre-
gate of fitness behavior, with the correlation between goals and
aggregates being somewhat higher than the correlation between
attitudes and aggregates.
The mediation model. As already noted, our theory suggests
that attitudes constitute the evaluative component of goals, which
in turn are the drivers of behaviors. This suggests that the relation
between attitudes and behaviors should be mediated by goals. We
analyzed the mediation model using the PROCESS program
(Hayes, 2013). As shown in Figure 7, the total effect of attitude on
behavior was significant (b 0.31, SE 0.12, 
  .27, p .010).
Attitude had a significant and positive effect on goal (b  0.92,
SE  0.14, 
  .58, p  .001). Goal had a positive effect on the
most frequent behavior (b  0.26, SE  0.09, 
  .36, p  .004).
The indirect effect of goal on the most frequent behavior estimated
with 20,000 bootstrapped samples was significant (b  0.24, 95%
CI [0.10,0.46]). The direct effect of attitude on behavior was not
significant (b  0.07, SE  0.14, 
  .06, p  .613). The entire
model was significant, F(2, 88) 8.31, p .001, R2  .16. These
findings, depicted in Figure 7, are consistent with our theory
whereby behavior is driven by goals of which attitudes constitute
the evaluative component.
In brief then, adopting the goals-means perspective affords a
demarcation between a case where an attitude toward an object is
highly related to a specific behavior, and a case where it is not, but
is highly related to a behavioral aggregate. The former case obtains
where the goal based on the attitude is predominantly served by the
specific behavior, being the most preferred or habitual means to
that objective (Wood & Neal, 2007). In contrast, the latter case
obtains where that goal is served often by other equifinal behav-
iors. An illustration of this demarcation is given in Figure 8. It
depicts Goal B that is served by three means, each being equally
instrumental to the goal (and so equally often used). In contrast,
Goal A is served by three unequally instrumental means. In that
latter case, Means 1 is more instrumental (and hence more pref-
erential) than Means 2 and 3.
The former case—wherein each goal is served by several equal
means—typified studies cited in support of the behavioral aggre-
gate hypothesis. Thus, in Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1974) study on
religious attitudes, researchers gave participants a checklist of 100
religious behaviors, and most participants checked off many such
16 We excluded 11 participants from the analyses because they did not
perform any activity at all (and therefore had no score on the dependent
variable). We also excluded 2 participants from the analyses because they
indicated that they performed all 24 physical activities we listed (that is
highly unlikely); however, the analyses with and without those two par-
ticipants included were nearly identical. Thus, the following analyses refer
to 91 participants.
Table 3
Correlations
Attitude Goal
Frequency of
dominant
behavior
Aggregated
behavior
(sum)
Attitude
Goal .58
Frequency of the dominant
behavior .27 .40
Aggregated behavior (sum) .21 .34 .53
Mean 3.78 6.95 5.70 36.93
SD 1.37 2.17 1.58 8.87
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
14 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
behaviors. Similarly, in Weigel and Newman’s (1976) study of
environmental attitudes, participants were offered 14 environmen-
tally friendly behaviors and many participants chose more than one
of those behaviors. In Werner’s (1978) study of abortion activism,
participants were given an 83-item checklist of behaviors related to
the goal of activism and many participants chose several such
means to the goal of activism. We argue that the behavioral
aggregate was more closely related to attitudes in these instances
because all of the means the participants chose from were equally
related to the goal (the example of Goal B in Figure 8). However,
in cases in which one means stands out from the rest in terms of its
association with the goal (e.g., Goal A in Figure 8), a specific
behavior can have a higher correlation with the attitude than does
the behavioral aggregate.
To reiterate then, a general attitude could be related to a specific
behavior if the attitude contributed to a dominant goal formation
(via the process elaborated earlier) and the goal was habitually
served by the behavior in question. More generally then, the goal
perspective identifies an important qualification concerning Ajzen
and Fishbein’s generalization, which categorically denies the pos-
sibility of (general) attitude to (specific) behavior relation (cf. the
compatibility principle, e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp. 258–
259). However, if general object attitudes can be related to spe-
cific behaviors (via the mediation of goals to which the attitudes
contribute) then the dismissal of general attitudes as predictors of
behavior, which motivated the TRA/TPB switch to attitudes to-
ward the behavior seems unwarranted. However, let us consider
now the constructive aspect of TRA/TPB theorizing that centers on
the concept of behavioral intentions.
On the determinants of behavioral intentions. First, it
should be clear that the concept of behavioral intention in TRA
and TPB refers to intention to execute a given behavior, and not to
attain a given goal. As Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) put it,
“Behavioral intentions are indications of a person’s readiness to
perform a behavior. The readiness to act, represented by an intention,
can find expression in such statements as the following: I will
engage in the behavior, I intend to engage in the behavior, I expect
to engage in the behavior, I plan to engage in the behavior, I will try
to engage in the behavior.” (p. 39, italics added)
In essence, behavioral intention concerns an act that serves as
means of goal attainment. Furthermore, the concepts of means and
goals are clearly distinct at least for the large class of extrinsically
motivated behaviors serving ulterior ends distinct from those be-
haviors (Shah & Kruglanski, 2000).
A staple of the TRA-TPB approach is the notion that behavioral
intentions are the antecedents of behavior. According to Ajzen
(1991), “the intention to perform a given behavior is ‘a central
factor in the theory of planned behavior,’” presumably because
“the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the more likely
should be its performance” (p. 181). The latter assertion seems
hardly controversial and rather a matter of common sense, how-
ever. Systematic research as well attests that especially where the
intention is assessed in close proximity to the behavior its relation
to the behavior is strong.17 None of it seems very surprising. It
seems obvious, for instance, that an intention18 reported moments
before the intended behavior should eventuate in the behavior
unless something unexpected happened. An individual admitting
in line to the box office to her intention “to view a movie” will
generally be expected to follow up on her intention, and so a
person reporting an intention of “going for a run” while putting on
her running shoes.
The contribution of the Ajzen and Fishbein’s approach presum-
ably lies not in the presumed intentions to behaviors link as such,
but rather in their suggested determinants of behavioral intentions,
namely attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms and per-
ceived behavioral control. Here is where the present analysis
diverges from their view. Specifically, we suggest that behavioral
intentions are crucially goal driven, as the intention to perform a
given behavior rests on beliefs that it constitutes a preferred means
to a currently active goal.10
Given the presence of an active goal, out of the class of available
means to that goal the preferred means might be affected by
beliefs about social norms, attitudes to behavior and perceived
behavioral control. But none of these should matter if an entirely
different goal was in place. For instance, if one likes running
(attitude to behavior), most of one’s friends applauded running
(subjective norm), and one is quite capable of running (perceived
17 Meta-analysis of 47 experimental tests of intention—behavior rela-
tions (Webb & Sheeran, 2006) showed that changing participants’ inten-
tions had a greater impact on behavior when the time interval between the
intention and behavior measures was short (i.e., less than or equal to the
median value of 11.5 weeks) as compared with long (d  0.46 vs. 0.23).
Other meta-analyses (e.g., Sheeran & Orbell, 1998) have shown the same
pattern.
18 Warshaw and Davis (1985a,1985b) draw the distinction between
behavioral intentions and behavioral expectations, that is, the expectations
that one would execute the behavior and find evidence that the latter (vs.
the former) can be the superior predictors of behaviors, for example, where
one can foresee that one’s intentions to perform a given behavior might
change under the circumstances.Figure 7. Mediation model of attitudes, goals, and behavior.
Figure 8. Two cases of goal-means relations. See the online article for
the color version of this figure.
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15ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
behavioral control)–one might well form the behavioral intention
to run and implement it too, but only if a relevant goal, say fitness,
was activated. Should an entirely different goal be activated, for
example, studying for an exam, or preparing a dinner party, atti-
tudes to running, subjective norms about running, and so forth,
even if contextually primed, would hardly produce the behavioral
intention to run.
Moreover, assuming that a goal assumed to be served by the
behavior was indeed activated, it is important to ask what factors
determine whether the intention to execute that particular behavior
will be formed. As elaborated earlier, we assume that a behavioral
intention is formed as function of the behavior’s perceived (a)
instrumentality to goal attainment (Labroo & Kim, 2009; Warshaw
& Davis, 1985b), and/or its perceived (b) supplementarity, the
conferral of added benefits beyond the specific goal’s attainment
(Kruglanski, Kopetz, et al., 2013).
From that perspective, in cases where they do impact behavioral
intentions, “attitude toward the behavior” and “subjective norm”
may largely reflect the perceived (by oneself and others) instru-
mentality/supplementarity of the behavioral means with respect to
a currently active goal (whereas perceived behavioral control
simply reflects one’s ability to carry out that behavioral means). In
this sense, AB and SN may function as indirect indices of instru-
mentality and supplementarity and there could exist alternative
such indices not anticipated by TPB—for instance, expert opinion
as to what behaviors are instrumental to a current goal, or moti-
vational biases that influence perceptions of instrumentality or
supplementarity (cf., Bélanger, Kruglanski, Chen, Orehek & John-
son, 2015).19 These considerations, absent from the TRA and TPB
models, follow directly from the assumption that behavior is goal
driven, and its choice hinges on its efficacy in regard to goal
attainment.
Empirical Study 5: Attitudes toward behavior, perceived
instrumentality, and intention formation. We tested the hy-
pothesis that presumed determinants of behavioral intentions iden-
tified in the TPB (i.e., attitude to the behavior, subjective norm,
and perceived behavioral control) will predict intentions only
where the behavior serves as means to an active goal. Consistent
with the present theory, we predicted also that in the latter case
impact on intentions would be mediated by the perceived instru-
mentality of the behavior to goal attainment. We tested these
hypotheses with regard to the behavior of “drinking alcohol when
going out.”
Forty-seven participants (23 females) took part in this study,
which was carried on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk on a Friday and
Saturday afternoon. Participants rated their attitude toward the
behavior of “drinking alcohol while going out” on three scales
with the endpoints marked “very bad to very good,” “very harmful
to very beneficial,” and “very unpleasant to very pleasant.” They
also answered the question “How much do you like drinking
alcohol when going out?” on a scale ranging from not at all to very
much (Cronbach’s 	  .89). To measure subjective norms, we
averaged participants’ ratings of agreement with two items
(adapted from Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010): “Most people who are
important to me approve of me drinking alcohol when going out”
and “Most people who are like me drink alcohol when they go
out.” (r  .58). Perceived behavioral control was measured with
an item “Drinking alcohol when I go out is up to me.” Instrumen-
tality of the behavior was measured with one item: “How much
does alcohol help you have fun when going out?” Behavioral
intention was measured with one item: “I intend to drink alcohol
tonight.” Finally, we asked participants whether they had the goal
of going out to have fun that night on a scale ranging from
definitely not to definitely yes. All items were answered on a
7-point scale.
Results. We tested a moderated mediation model with attitude
as a predictor and behavioral intention as the outcome variable.
Instrumentality was treated as the mediator and goal was included
as a moderator of the instrumentality–behavioral intention path
(see Figure 9). We used the PROCESS program for this analysis
(Model 14, Hayes, 2013).
The total effect of attitude on intention was significant (b .44,
SE .18, 
  .34, p .021). When controlling for attitude toward
the behavior, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control
had no significant relation to intentions and we excluded them
from the final model.20 Attitude had also a significant and positive
effect on perceived instrumentality of the behavior (b  1.01,
SE  0.17, 
  .67, p  .001). As expected, there was a
significant interaction between instrumentality and goal presence
(b  0.13, SE  .05, 
  .28, p  .02). More importantly, the
indirect effect of attitude on intention mediated by instrumentality,
estimated with 20,000 bootstrapped samples, was significant when
the goal was present (b  0.52, 95% CI [0.24, 1.31]) but nonsig-
nificant when the goal was absent (b  0.09, 95% CI [0.13,
0.35]). Index of moderated mediation was significant (0.13, 95%
CI [0.04, 0.34]). The direct effect of attitude after controlling for
instrumentality and goal was not significant (b  0.31, SE  0.22,

  .23, p  .179). The entire model was significant, F(4, 42) 
6.14, p  .001, R2  .37. Consistent with the present theory then,
attitudes toward the behavior predict behavioral intentions only
where the behavior serves a current goal, highlighting the central-
ity of the goal concept to behavior’s occurrence.
Prior Support for the TRA-TPB Models
Indeed, a close review of prior support for the TRA-TPB for-
mulations reveals a clear, albeit unarticulated, presence of active
goals to which the behaviors chosen served as means. To wit, in a
widely cited study by Schifter and Ajzen (1985) on weight loss
success in college women, the authors were specifically interested
only in participants who very likely had the goal to lose weight, as
attested by the authors’ comment that “women who considered
themselves overweight were encouraged to participate” in the
study (p. 845). More generally, the wording of Schifter and
Ajzen’s intentions measures was very similar to how one might
phrase a goal: The participants were asked to respond to items such
as “I will try to reduce weight over the next 6 weeks” and “I have
19 It is of interest to note in this connection that the multiple correlation
of attitude to behavior, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control
account for rather low percentage of variance in behavioral intentions (39%
in the Armitage & Conner, 2001, analysis and above 36% in Fishbein &
Ajzen’s, 2010, review). Consistent with the present analysis then, the AB,
SN, and PBC measures do not appear to fully tap the determinants of
behavioral intentions.
20 It will be noted that in the situation depicted in this study subjective
norm was highly correlated with attitude toward the behavior (r  .85),
suggesting that the attitude reflected an internalized norm, and perceived
behavioral control was uniformly high among participants (restricting the
range on this variable).
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16 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
decided to lose weight over the next six weeks.” These measures
are more related to the goal of losing weight in the near future,
than to the intention to perform a specific behavior to that end.
Other studies of attitude-behavior relation strongly imply the situ-
ational presence of goals that drove the behavior of interest—for
instance, Sivacek and Crano (1982) posited that what they termed
“vested interest” moderates attitude-behavior consistency. In two
studies, they found that the strength of the attitude-behavior relation-
ship varied as a function of individuals’ perceived vested interest on
the attitude issue, with those who had more vested interest displaying
higher attitude-behavior consistency. Specifically, students who felt
strongly that they would be affected (either positively or negatively)
by the imposition of a university-wide comprehensive exam behaved
more consistently with their expressed attitudes toward the exam.
Again, it seems highly plausible that for affected students promoting
the exam or preventing it (respectively) constituted an important goal
that drove their behavioral choices.
Attitude toward the behavior as such would matter if the goal(s)
to which the behavior was instrumental were present in the situ-
ation. For instance, if several of the behavior’s consequences
(affecting attitude toward the behavior according to TPB) defined
situationally present goals, such multifinal behavior would be
chosen over its less multifinal alternatives (Kruglanski, Kopetz, et
al., 2013). In this vein, Fabrigar et al. (2006) suggested that the
relevance of an attitude to a particular behavior moderates attitude-
behavior consistency. They tested this by giving participants in-
formation about two department stores and asking them to choose
where they would buy a camera after they had either been given
relevant information about the camera department or not. Across
three studies, Fabrigar et al. (2006) found that attitudes toward the
department stores were more likely to lead to behavior when the
attitudes were relevant to the behavior, that is, where the relevant
information suggested the camera department to be superior or
inferior. Clearly in this case, buying a high quality camera consti-
tuted participants’ (hypothetical) goal and relevant (vs. irrelevant)
information about the camera department pertained to whether a
given camera department (vs. its alternative) would be a better
(more instrumental) means to that goal. However, general infor-
mation about the department store (producing an attitude toward
the store) pertained to other goals that a purchaser might well have
in this situation, concerning customer service, aesthetic experi-
ence, and so forth, suggesting that carrying out a purchase in the
specific department store may be multifinal (Kruglanski, Kopetz,
et al., 2013). Therefore, if the camera department was portrayed as
superior (for instance) and the attitude toward the department store
was positive (i.e., one could expect other concerns to be met in that
store) the purchase would be more likely (purchase would be
perceived as a more multifinal means) than if attitude to the
department store was negative. However, attitude to the depart-
ment store should matter little if the camera department was
inferior (defining an ineffective means to the focal goal).
Finally, several recent studies have demonstrated that priming
manipulations induce behavior only if they create conditions that
affect the activation of preexisting goals. Thus, Stroebe et al.
(2013) observed that only obese (vs. nonobese) shoppers (for
whom weight loss was a likely goal) were influenced by diet/
health primes handed out in a recipe flyer, and proceeded to
purchase significantly fewer unhealthy snack items. Similarly,
Fitzsimons and Bargh (2003) found that priming participants with
the word “mom” increased achievement only for those who
wanted to make their mom proud of them.
In summary, the goal-systemic notions of means-ends relations
seem helpful to clarifying the conditions under which (a) a general
attitude may or may not bear a substantial relation to a specific
behavior, as well as circumstances under which (b) the presump-
tive determinants of a specific behavioral intention spelled out in
the TPB will or will not produce the intention in question. In that
sense, the present analysis identifies important limitations to gen-
eralizations suggested by the TPB.
General Discussion
Beyond random bodily movements and reflex actions, human
behavior is purposive or goal driven (cf., Tolman, 1932). This pertains
to explicit, highly conscious goals (getting admitted to college, ac-
quiring a home) as well as to implicit, below the radar goals induced
by subliminal priming—such as goals of cooperation, competition,
self-control or achievement (cf. Bargh et al., 2001; Hassin et al., 2009;
Kleiman & Hassin, 2011). It pertains to spontaneous or “automatic”
behaviors that require little energetic resources, as well as to “delib-
erative” behaviors whose execution is driven by considerable re-
sources. In all these instances, however different in some respects,
behaviors typically constitute means to situationally present goals.
Though attitudes are relevant to goal formation they do not in and
of themselves define goals. To address the additional steps that need
to take place, the present, goal-systemic, analysis depicts a multiply
contingent path (expressed in Equation 3) between attitudes toward
objects or states of affairs and behaviors related to those attitudes.
Figure 9. Moderated mediation model of attitude, instrumentality, goal, and behavioral intention.
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17ROCKY ROAD FROM ATTITUDES TO BEHAVIORS
Based on a widely accepted definition of attitudes as evaluative
responses akin to liking, we noted first that liking (in an absolute
sense) need not be tantamount to wanting (Bagozzi, 1992; Berridge,
2004). Rather, wanting implies a disparity, a discrepancy of a pro-
motive or preventive kind (see Equations 1 and 2), between liking of
a present versus a future state. Moreover, in itself wanting (desire)
may not produce goal formation (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Rather,
perceived attainability should be at an above threshold level for goal
formation to ensue. Furthermore, for a given goal to drive behavior it
needs to be dominant in the situation rather than being overridden by
other more important objectives (Huang & Bargh, 2014; Shah et al.,
2002). Finally, a specific behavioral means needs to be chosen as
superior in some sense (e.g., as most instrumental, or most multifinal)
to other available means to the same end. In short, for an attitude to
eventuate in a specific behavior a chain of events needs to unfold,
each constituting a necessary link without which the attitude behavior
connection would be severed.
Our analysis builds on prior models and research on attitude-
behavior relations and identifies limitations to their applicability.
Specifically, we considered from the present theoretical perspective
the two major paradigms wherein the attitude behavior relation was
studied: (a) the attitude strength paradigm and (b) the behavioral focus
paradigm. In regard to the first paradigm, our theory implies that
although strength of an object-attitude at some minimal magnitude
seems necessary for relative liking (RL) of future versus present states
to transform into wanting, attitude strength alone is insufficient to
drive behavior. Specifically, wanting must combine with attainability
beliefs to foster goal formation, the goal thus formed must be the
dominant one in the situation and the behavior must represent a
chosen means to that particular goal.
More important, this process is assumed to apply equally to
automatically driven, or “spontaneous” behaviors prompted by
goal priming (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001) and to behaviors undertaken
after a painstaking, “deliberative” consideration of the attitude
object’s “positive and negative features, (as well as) . . . costs and
benefits.” (Fazio, 1990, p. 89, parentheses added). The latter
deliberative process may results in a construction of a new object-
attitude that may translate into wanting (to attain or avoid it). It is
also worth noting that the “choice” aspect of means to the goal
may reduce in some cases to just embracing the habitual means
that popped up upon goal formation; that might occur if such
means was strongly conditioned to the goal and if the actor lacked
the motivation or the resources to seek alternative means.
Concerning the behavior focus paradigm, the major implication
of our analysis is that its dismissal of object attitudes’ part in
driving behavior was premature. It is such attitudes after all that (in
their relative form, RL) contribute to goal formation, which ulti-
mately results in behavior. Indeed, we have seen that when a given
behavior is strongly preferred as means of goal attainment, the
relation between the general attitude and the specific behavior can
be quite substantial, and it is crucially mediated by goal formation
based on the attitude in question (see Figure 7).
Moreover, whereas there can be no doubt that behavioral inten-
tions do drive behavior, we question the proposal of the TRA and
TPB models that it is attitude toward the behavior, behavioral
norms, and perceived behavioral control that necessarily determine
behavioral intentions. According to the present analysis, (a) none
of these factors would affect behavioral intentions if the goal to
which the behavior was the means was absent, whereas (b) if the
goal was present these factors, though relevant, may not be the
exclusive or the most important determinants of behavioral inten-
tions. Rather, the behavior’s instrumentality to the goal and its
supplementarity (tapping the classic motivational parameters of
expectancy and value, respectively) could be the primary determi-
nants of behavioral intentions.
Testability
Our “Rocky Road” model of attitude to behavior relations has
numerous testable implications. Two alternative research strategies
may be followed in this regard, namely of (a) subtracting, or (b)
bypassing links in the attitude to behavior chain. In that chain the
attitude elements (i.e., relative liking) are viewed as distal to behavior,
and the wanting and goal elements are viewed as more proximal to
behavior. The subtractive strategy rests on the implication that if the
proximal elements to which attitudes contributed were missing, the
attitude to behavior chain would be severed, and no behavior would
follow from mere attitudes. For instance, we predict that an accessible
attitude would fail to induce behavior if a reasonable sense of goal
attainability was absent. Moreover, even if attainability was present,
no attitude-related behavior should follow if a different goal, unrelated
to the accessible attitude, was dominant.
Similarly, the determinants of a behavioral intention identified
in the TPB (attitudes to the behavior, etc.) should fail to produce
the intention (and the correspondent behavior) if the goal was
absent to which the behavior in question was a means. Finally,
those determinants should fail to engender a behavioral intention if
a different behavior was identified as more instrumental toward
goal attainment (Labroo & Kim, 2009), and/or to bring greater
supplementary value, by dint of its multifinality (Kruglanski, Kö-
petz et al., 2013). These varied implications could be profitably
probed in future research guided by the present model.
An alternative research strategy rests on bypassing the distal
elements in the chain and focusing on the proximal ones. Specif-
ically, if measures of the proximal elements were available mea-
sures of the distal (constitutive) links would be superfluous and
could, therefore, be bypassed in behavioral prediction. For in-
stance, if measures of wanting were available, measures of atti-
tudes could be dispensed with, because they would have been
already encompassed in the wanting measures. Similarly, mea-
sures of goal formation would obviate measures of wanting, be-
cause wanting is part and parcel of goal formation. Simply put,
effects on behavior of the early links are assumed to be mediated
by the subsequent links so once the latter are taken into account,
effects of the former would vanish (as in Figure 7 above). These
predictions too could be fruitfully explored in future research.21
21 It is noteworthy that the present model can be fruitfully applied to all
domains of research where the attitude-behavior relations were investi-
gated. Take, for instance, individual differences in attitude-behavior con-
sistency. The findings of such differences presumably reflect the relative
stability of individuals’ (attitude derived) goals that drive the consistency.
For instance, it is found that low self-monitors tend to act more consistently
with their attitudes than do high self-monitors (Snyder, 1983), and it is
possible that the attitudes and attitude derived goals of the former are more
stable and chronically accessible than those of the latter. In that instance
too, one would predict that if goal formation was rendered impossible (e.g.,
by eliminating attainability) the attitude behavior consistency for the indi-
viduals involved would vanish as well.
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18 KRUGLANSKI ET AL.
Finally, it is of interest to consider an approach to behavioral
prediction based on the goal systemic perspective. Such approach
would require close attention to the several relevant elements in
the attitude-to behavior chain as they may be represented in a
given context of interest. Specifically, information about the per-
son and about the situation would be needed. The former would
concern the potential actor’s general motives in accordance with a
broad motivational taxonomy, for example, by Fiske (2003) or
Higgins (2012). Information about the situation would concern the
motive-relevant goals a given situational context may induce, and
the means that the situational constraints may afford. For instance,
if an individual was assessed as high on achievement motivation
and the situation was deemed to activate an achievement goal, a
person may embark on an achievement task if one was available.
Moreover, a task believed to be most instrumental to gratifying
one’s achievement motivation (e.g., one where an immediate feed-
back was available) might be deemed as preferable over a task less
likely to do so (e.g., one with a delayed feedback or absent
feedback altogether). In situations where several of the individu-
al’s goals were activated, it would be important to determine which
one was dominant, and what means would be (subjectively) most
likely to promote it.
Where two or more goals of near equal magnitude are activated,
a multifinal means might be preferred over a unifinal means
relevant to one of those goals exclusively (Kruglanski, Köpetz et
al., 2013). Finally, where several equifinal means to a goal seemed
available, or in a novel situation where possible means were
unfamiliar to the actor, prediction of the behavior would be more
uncertain than in a situation where a habitual means to the goal
was available (see Figure 8). For instance, some individuals whose
goal of self enhancement was situationally activated might pursue
it by a habitual means (e.g., by demonstrating a well practiced
skill, or by a careful grooming of one’s appearance) whereas other
persons may lack a specific self enhancement habit (cf. Wood &
Neal, 2007) and hesitate between different modes of self enhance-
ment (e.g., whether to appear knowledgeable, sensitive, athletic, or
wise). Behavioral prediction may then be more assured in the
former versus the latter case.
Coda
All things considered, predicting behaviors from attitudes to-
ward objects or states of affairs is a precarious business fraught
with complex contingencies. An attitude (or liking) toward an
object is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for wanting
the object in question; furthermore, wanting in and of itself need
not produce goal commitment, which in turn may not drive any
given behavior as a means of goal attainment. A more realistic
approach to behavioral prediction may require familiarity with the
individual’s motivational make-up and with the motivationally
relevant structure of the situation, including goals that the situation
may activate and the means-ends configurations it may evoke.
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